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POLITICAL FACTORS IN THE
FORMULATION OF NATIONAL STRATEGY
Harold D. Lasswell
Since military strategy is part of the
decision-making process among participants in world politics, we may begin
our examination of the subject by considering the arena of world affairs. A
few years ago the professional students
of international law, international relations and strategy would give a glib
reply when questioned about the identity of the participants in world politics.
They would talk in terms of the "state"
or the "nation state". And this is still
the conventional answer. But it has
become increasingly unsatisfactory for
anyone who must look beyond legal
forms to the facts of power in a rapidly
changing world. The conception of a
"state" is formalistic. According to traditional theory all "states" are "equal"
once officially recognized by the
existing members of the state system.
Such a conception can scarcely be taken
literally by anyone who looks at the
power relations. among governments.
Side by side with the language of
international law there has grown up a
vocabulary designed to describe the
distribution of effective power. It
speaks of great powers, middle powers,
small powers and dependents; and, more
recently, in view of the tendency
toward bipolarity, of "superpowers" or
"giant" powers. It is clear that any
serviceable categories will use two sets

of terms, one for formal authority, and
the other for effective control. If we say
that sixty or seventy states are sovereign
equals, we must also be able to say that
the effective pattern of power in the
world arena is bipolar, polypolar, multipolar, or whatever else the facts indicate. We can make very important distinctions between lawful power (authoritative and controlling), naked
power (controlling but not authoritative), and nominal power (authoritative
but not controlling).
The disadvantage of taking the state
as the unit of participation in world
politics is not only that the distinction
between formal and effective power is
blurred, but that other participants have
become so important that it is misleading to relegate them to a subordinate position. International intergovernmental organizations have been
set up by official action for general
purposes (League of Nations, United
Nations), and for a diversity of special
purposes (health, science, and the like).
It is true that these organizations
operate under the formal authority of
national states. But an examination of
their influence will show that on some
matters they are of decisive importance.
The result of having an international
hierarchy of officials, and assemblies
and councils that meet frequently is to
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establish a new mechansim of much
greater weight on many subjects than
was possible when intergovernmental
cooperation was sporadic and bilateral.
The list of participants needs also to
be enlarged by adding transnational
political parties. They are not always
under the domination of anyone government. The communist movement,
for instance, was a power factor in
world affairs long before the seizure of
power in Moscow in 1917. International
bands of revolutionists were active for
decades seeking to organize bases for
revolutionary seizures whenever crises
of unemployment, of military defeat, or
some other catastrophe created a revolutionary situation. Even when a revolutionary party organization is transformed into a humble appendage of an
existing government, some of its remaining influence comes from the impression
in various quarters that it represents
something bigger than the government
in question.
Besides transnational political parties
there is much to be said for adding the
supranational pressure groups to the list
of effective participants in the decisionmaking process of the globe. Pressure
groups are set up for the purpose of
influencing policy. They differ from
political parties in that they do not
formulate comprehensive political programs, or openly put up candidates in
elections. A recent tabulation suggests
that about a thousand supranational
pressure organizations are actively promoting changes in the educational,
medical, economic and other relations
among peoples.
When we go behind supranational
pressure groups and parties we typically
come to private associations that
operate across national boundaries.
These organizations are not primarily
specialized to the power value; rather,
they use power incidentally to other
purposes. In this connection think of
the impact of business organizations
that reach across many frontiers, and of

trade unions, churches, scientific and
professional associations. Private organizations have often been strong enough
to upset governments, and to give decisive help to new regimes.
If we push our analysis far enough
we come to individual human beings.
Influential individuals (and families)
often operate transnationally.
The position of the military strategist
in the modem decision-making process
is highly diversified. In some places he is
the advisor to a national government, as
in the U.S. Elsewhere he may be the
advisor of a government that purports
to represent several nations. When the
element of coercion plays a significant
part, we speak of an empire (like the
Soviet Empire) rather than a unified
national state (like Sweden). In some
cases the military strategist is advising a
small political class that is relatively cut
off from the rest of the society under its
control. The members of this small
ruling class may follow world affairs,
and share the news and comment current among all who keep in touch with
happenings throughout the globe. Below
the political elite the society may be
composed of kinship groups more concerned with tribal affairs than with the
world at large. The underlying population may be nomadic or agricultural. It
may remain self-absorbed in the treadmill of the seasons and the world views
of a traditional culture. The underlying
population may be more or less disorganized as a result of employment as a
labor force in mines, plantations and
other large-scale operations. The political role of the strategic advisor is circumscribed by the integration of the
top decision makers with the society as
a whole.
The military strategist often grades
over to the role of a police officer or a
subversionist. We all know the usual
distinction between a military specialist
and a policeman. According to our
tradition the proper function of the
armed forces is to repel foreign enemies,
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and we are inclined to look with a
jaundiced eye upon attempts to involve
these forces in the maintaining of internal order. The civilian tradition of
English speaking countries has led us to
put blocks in the road of executives
who want to use the armed forces at
home. (Our history recalls the abuse of
authority in the hope of preserving
unpopular dynasties).
In modern despotisms it is impossible
to recognize a sharp line between military and police forces. Consider the
interpenetration of the German officers
corps by the Nazi party, and the complex allocations of responsibility for
compulsory labor camps at home and
abroad, and for extermination camps;
and for the encouragement of foreign
subversion.
To some extent the encouragement
of foreign subversion has always been
part of the military function. It has
been taken for granted that an intelligence job would be done in advance on
possible opponents (in addition to wartime operations). Inducements would be
employed to encourage spies to betray
the nation. Often these operations implicate large numbers of people. ryle
hear of the 70,000 agents used by the
Germans in anticipation of 1870.) In
more recent years the appearance of
despotism, bipolarization and acute
ideological conflict have enormously
increased the strategic role of subversive
activity.
Under modern conditions, therefore,
military officers sometimes find themselves acting as advisors and liaison men
to very strange groups indeed. They
may work with supranational political
parties to improve the strategy and
tactics of espionage, sabotage and street
fighting. From Nuremburg and other
sources we know of the prewar use of
military advisors in connection with
paramilitary formations and pressure
organizations of many kinds. (Thele is,
by the way, a big literature on the
revolutionary technique evolved by the

social revolutionists of the nineteenth
century and the early twentieth, some
of whom had professional training and
experience).
When we consider the intimacy of
association between strategists and top
decision makers, the connection appears
to be closest when the government has
been taken over by military coup. But
the top man may be satisfied with his
own genius as a planner and a commander, so that anyone who is invited
to advise finds that he is relegated to a
modest role. Even under these circumstances, however, the advisor may be
more than a "yes-man" who thinks only
when spoken to. He may continue to
make independent analyses of the factors that influence the security of the
whole nation, and seek to clarify the
minds of top decision makers concerning long-run matters. Cases of this kind
have occurred among the advisors of
warlords who seized power in some
province in China. There have been
nationally-minded advisors who tried to
shepherd their warlord along the path of
unifying the whole Chinese people in
order to maintain the integrity of China
under modern perils.
It is noteworthy that trained officers
are not as a rule at the top of modern
mass party movements which have captured power. Actually there is latent
and often overt tension between the
leadership and trained officers. Men like
Mussolini, Lenin and Hitler were gifted
propagandists and organizers of mass
movements who looked with mixed
feelings at general staffs and top commands. The communist party was so
fearful that the central policy of the
organization would be under the domination of military specialists that they
made a cult of the supremacy of the
political man over the specialists. An
entirely new set of officers was trained
as rapidly as possible after the Civil War
period in the hope of wiping out ideological residues of the pre-Bolshevik era,
and of indoctrinating officers of the

141
Red Army with the fundamental importanee of subordinating themselves to
the eentral policy organs of the party
(and government). Threatened by revolt
and intervention, however, the communist rulers of the Soviet world have been
recruited from individuals who almost
invariably have political police training
and experience. The Nazi movement
took over control of the officers by the
tactics of "divide and rule." Compliant
members of the officers corps were
advanced, while the more towering professional personalities were gradually
disposed of by whatever methods (including false charges) were expedient.
In a nation possessing a strong tradition of popular rule, like the U.S. and
Great Britain, the political factors in the
formulation of strategy are in one sense
simple. In Britain the responsibility for
top decision rests with the Cabinet and
the Parliament, and eventually the electorate. In the United States the integration rests with the President and the
Congress, and ultimately the electorate.
Formally speaking, political assumptions are communicated to the strategist
by the competent political authorities,
who receive advice for the overall implementation of the national policy goals
and objectives recommended. Top authorities clarify and commit national
policy in the light of the advice tendered by the military strategists, and by
thosc charged with diplomatic, economic and ideological implements of
policy.
In practice the relation of the military strategist to the top is far from
attaining such diagrammatic clarity.
First of all, the words in which national
goals and objectives are stated tend to
be ambiguous or ultraspecific. That is, if
the President or the Congress is asked
what they want to achieve in the
domain of foreign policy in the next
five years, the replies are likely to sound
very ambiguous indeed. We know of
course that the national security calls
for the deterrence of aggression by

foreign countries, abstinence from
aggressive acts on our part, and successful counteraction if necessary. But the
translation of these broad requirements
into more operational terms is not easy.
By ultraspecificity is meant words that
sound definite enough, but which must
be taken with a grain of salt. Even the
most emphatic and explicit statement
may be a poor guide for the future. (In
the U.S. the strategist is likely to remember Korea).
Uncertain as this may appear to be,
such are the facts of life in popular
government. The military strategist
must adapt himself to performing his
obligation to the nation within this
framework. On reflection, however, we
conclude that the advisor-planner is by
no means as devoid of guidance as the
foregoing paragraph may suggest. By the
proper use of the appropriate tools of
investigation and analysis, much can be
learned. By examining the· trends of
official policy in this country and
abroad, the strategist is able to predict
some of the situations involving national
security that may arise, together with
the policy objectives likely to be supported at home and abroad. The projection of past trends will often show that
conflicts are in the making (typically
when two opposing developments are
practically certain to meet). The rearming of Germany, even in pre-Nazi
days, pointed toward changes in the
balance of power throughout Europe
(and hence throughout the globe). Adequate interpretation of the future obviously calls for more than simple extrapolation of past lines of change, and the
uncovering of facilities or incompatible
trends. It is important to conduct a
scientific examination of the balance of
factors that have favored or retarded a
given response, and to include in the
assessment of the future, estimates of
the probable presence or absence of
these conditioning factors.
If we look at the history of strategic
planning and recommendation, it is
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clear that the professionals have sometimes failed to make use of the tools of
comparative historical, scientific, and
projective analysis which are essential to
the task. Our war histories are now
calling attention to a number of alleged
limitations that affected strategy between the two world wars. It appears
that too much weight was given to the
headlines of the twenties and early
thirties. The prevailing tone of the
Presidents, the Congress, the political
parties, the pressure groups, and the
press was "isolationist" Since the U.S.
had no diplomatic commitments to an
ally, forward planning was often made
on the. assumption that the U.S. would
go it alone in the war crisis of the
future.
The tools of analysis to which I have
referred in making an assessment of
political factors affecting U.S. policy
were actually used with success by the
advisors of other governments. Important elements in Great Britain, for
instance, correctly foresaw that if
Britain were threatened by a resurgent
Germany, the U.S. would interpret our
national security to include the defense
of Britain, and the prevention of the
unification of Western Europe by conquest
In developing strategies in execution
of national objectives, once clarified (or
postulated), a fundamental question is
how much initial loss can be endured by
the nation. How much loss can the U.S.
afford to suffer at the outbreak of a war
in which modern weapons are used by
the opponent in his surprise attack?
This is a more complicated question
than tabulating and estimating data
about weapons and industrial capacity.
It is necessary to estimate the crucial
political factors. Will losses of a certain
magnitude (of people and production
facilities) produce a disproportionately
great increase in disunity? Will this
significantly influence the strength of
the immediate counterattack against the
enemy? Will it importantly affect the

restoration and use of production
capacity in order to mount a decisive
offensive within a relatively short time?
At first it appears that there are no
exact parallels from the past. Crippling
as the Japanese surprise attack was, for
instance, it did not demolish a large
fraction of our production facilities, nor
decimate a significant fraction of our
population. But it is possible to discern
pertinent variables in past situations.
Suppose that we try to envisage the
direction, intensity and efficiency of the
response of the American people should
our industrial centers be made unusable
by surprise, and the scale of civilian
casualties reach unprecedented heights.
There have been cases of disaster in
which panic has been held at a minimum. One factor was the very long
anticipation shared by the public that
the disaster might occur. Another point
is that the members of the community
must not feel that they deserve to suffer
because they have been led into disaster
by self-serving and short-sighted men.
Furthermore, in the midst of a disastrous blow unity may be sustained if
there is equality of treatment of all
sufferers, irrespective of region, religion
and color.
In calculating strengths and vulnerabilities in so far as they involve political factors, it is essential to consider all
major deprivations to assess the
probable response of the different components of the population, and to estimate the changes in attitude that are
likely to be brought about between now
(the time the estimate is made) and
when the attack is postulated to occur.
All this has a bearing on such major
estimates as the size and nature of the
burden to be imposed upon the nation
in advance of hostilities. Assume that
we can make a dependable estimate of
the level of armament that would exercise a stateable degree of deterrence of
potential attackers. An element in the
final choice of armament level is the
probable internal effect of various levels
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upon U.S. unity. (Can we say, for
instance, that when a specified level is
cxceeded, a comparatively sharp increase in disaffection follows?)
Up to this point we have looked at
the position of the military strategist in
the modem world, and paying particular
attention to the political factors pertinent to the goals, objectives, strengths
and vulnerabilities of the national policy
served by the strategist. We shift now to
. another dimension of the problem, and
examine some political elements that
enter into the response of potential or
actual opponents. We must, see the
world from the standpoint of the current and the prospective decision
makcrs of foreign powers. Hence we
encounter the same kind of uncertainty
that enters into the interpretation of
our decision makers. Even if we were
able to ask those in charge of top policy
abroad when they propose to attack (if
at all), the replies (even though candid)
might be ambiguous, or show the same
ultraspecificity of which we remarked
before. We can no more take the dictators at face value than we can take the
democrats. In evaluating even direct
testimony we must consider the imprint
of another purge, or of a great success
or defeat in an intermediate country.
The examination of the policy goals,
objectives, strengths, and vulnerabilities
of the potential opponent calls for the
estimation of developments, assuming
first that our policy remains much the
same. Later we bring in the consideration of the impact of possible changes in
our own policy. A key question in
reference to the decision-making process
abroad is parallel to the question that
we posed in reference to our own
nation: What are the present authoritative prescriptions for the making of such
basic decisions as war or peace? Do the
agencies charged with nominal authority
appear to have effective control? Who
are the effective decision makers: What
are their politically significant perspectives? How are these perspectives

influenced by cultural characteristics?
Class origins? Experience? Personality
traits? By the security or insecurity of
the position of leaders now or at various
levels of crisis? In the future if changes
occur in the group composition of the
leadership, will it make any difference
so far as the policies in which we are
interested are concerned? For instance,
if the leadership is widely recruited
from diverse nationality groups, will it
make for more or less internal unity, or
for more or less aggressiveness in foreign
relations? If the coming elite is largely
recruited from the recently established
families of the army, police, party
bureaucracy, official bureaucracy, will it
have any significant effect? (For instance: are those with military police
experience so sensitive to internal division that they are timid about launching
a war? Are they so much impressed by
the progress of subversion at home that
they believe a war to be necessary to
preserve the regime? Are they so much
impressed by report of subversion
abroad that war appears unnecessary in
order to win out in the world struggle?
Are they impressed by the absence of
successful subversion abroad so that
security seems only possible as a result
of successful war?) Are the personalities
who come to the top in the regime
willing to take great responsibility for
important decisions; or, on the contrary, are they accustomed to evade
risky decisions by temporizing? Does
this mean a drift into war because the
top leaders do not stand out against a
growing consensus among their numbers? Or does it mean that war is
continually postponed?)
The foregoing questions have been
directed to considering the composition
of the decision makers, and assessing the
perspectives in which they are likely to
view political matters of importance to
our security. A further step is necessary.
Besides thinking of the results of a
possible change in elite composition, we
must estimate the probability that

144
significant changes will in fact occur.
This calls for a systematic examination
of the social processes which are likely
to affect the political process of the
opposing power. Without making an
exhaustive inventory, we can at least
direct attention to some dimensions of
the total problem:
Wealth (economic institutions). What
are the probable changes in the technology and the magnitude of production? Standards of living? Saving and
investment? How will these developments affect the perspectives of the
political elite?
Respect (social class institutions).
How is the class structure likely to
change? That is, will the upper, middle
and lower respect groupings become
more or less mobile? Will this increase
or decrease the unity of the community
as a whole? How will these changes
influence the perspectives of the effective elite of power?
Well-being (safety, health, comfort).
How are the numbers, and the physical
and mental health, of the population
likely to change? Will internal tensions
be increased and the pressure for external expansion increased or reduced?
Enlightenment (public information,
civic education). Will information about
the outside world available at all levels
become more fantastic, so that the
external world is viewed as vile and
pusillanimous? Will the information
available at the top share this image
progressively, or will it on the contrary
diverge from the popular picture,
creating perpetual sources of tension in
the control of international chauvinism?
Despite the images purveyed in mass
media of communication controlled by
the government, will undercurrents of
scepticism result in a general disinclination to credit officially propagated
statements, and produce a feeble positive faith in the destiny of the whole
community in its foreign relations?
Skill (professions and occupations).
Will the growth of industrialization

bring with it a network of scientific,
engineering, and skilled labor talent so
absorbed in improving their own conditions of life and opportunities that there
will be little interest in external expansion? Or will the growth of some skill
groups create strong vested interests in
expansion, in order to gain greater scope
than the home countries permit?
Affection (family, fraternal institutions). Will the pervading suspiciousness
characteristic of all forms of public life
lead to intense emotional bonds among
members of the family and the early
friendship group, with the result that
the security of the intimate circle is
more significant than more grandiose
dreams of expansion in the name of
larger social units? Or will the concern
for the family have the effect of leaving
politics in the hands of egocentric,
calculating and unscrupulous persons
who are concerned with the vast drama
of world politics, and willing to take all
the risks involved?
Rectitude (standards of right and
wrong, of responsibility). Will the older
religious faiths continue to survive and
indeed gain in vitality? Will secular
doctrines lose their capacity to involve
fervent faith and self-sacrifice? How will
these changing standards influence the
outlook of persons who have an opportunity to take a strong role in political
affairs? (e.g., will they withdraw and
leave the decision to the utterly unscrupulous; or will they develop a sense
of responsibility for ameliorating the
general condition of tension?).
It will be observed that the categories
employed here refer to a way of describing the social process of any community, whether a local nieghborhood,
a nation, or even the world as a whole.
We speak of the social process as man
pursuing values through institutions
using resources. The values (the categories of preferred events) are kept few
for convenience of analysis (eight:
power, wealth, respect, well-being, enlightenment, skill, affection, rectitude).
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The specialized patterns by which these
values are shaped and shared are the
institutions. Social processes may be
compared with one another according
to the degree in which values are widely
made available to the members of the
whole community, or the degree to
which they are concentrated in relatively few hands. The first is a society
that is relatively democratic; the second,
relatively despotic (or a traditional
oligarchy).
Having appraised the current and
prospective decision-making process of
the opposing power, the strategist is in a
position to evaluate the probable impact
of the various instruments of action
available to his own decision makers.
Repeating a previous analysis it is convenient for many purposes to say that
the goals and objectives of national
policy may be sought by four major
instruments of policy: military, economic, diplomatic, ideological. The distinctive means of military strategy are
arms; of economic strategy, goods; of
diplomacy, deals; and ideological
strategy, words. In terms of distinctive
effects military strategy aims at destruction (or production), economic strategy
at scarcity (or abundance), diplomacy at
the disunity of leaders (or unity), and
ideological strategy at the disunity of
masses (or unity). As a check list:
Strategy

Distinctive Means

Military
Economic
Diplomatic
Ideological

Arms
Goods
Deals
Words

Distinctive Effects
Destruction (or protection)
Scarcity (or abundance)
Disunity of Leaders (or unity)
Disunity of Masses (or unity)
The formulation and execution of
military strategy calls for the proper
articulation of all distinctive military
means and effects with all the instru-

ments by which national policy objectives are sought. The overriding principle is that of maximization, or the
attainment of all the values sought by
policy at the least cost (appraised in
terms of those values). When we speak
of political factors in the formulation of
strategy we are referring to the assumptions that are to be made about the
national goals and objectives to be
accomplished; and further the weight to
be assigned to factors of intention in
achieving of these aims.
These instrumentalities of national
policy may be employed in situations
short of war, in war, and at the end of
war. For the moment we are thinking of
the political factlJrs involved in the use
of military strategy (in the context of
policy goals, and in coordination with
the other instruments of policy) in
situations short of war, and intended to
influence the opposing elite. We assume
that the goals pursued are the deterrence of aggression by the opposing
power, and the maintenance of a position which, if necessary, would enable
us to use force effectively if aggression
occurs.
In this connection we note first of all
that military instruments possess certain
special advantages in the prosecution of
national policy in these short-of-war
situations. I refer to the well-nigh compulsory control that can be exercised
over the focus of attention of the
opposing elite by moving our own
"hardware." Ships, planes and guns are
very tangible indeed, and exert peremptory control over the senses of
those who are equipped to recognize the
political significance of weapons. The
top staffs and decision makers abroad
must pay the same strict attention to
our hardware that we do to theirs.
This point applies universally. But
there are special factors that predispose
the members of some ruling elites to
emphasize the significance of military
weapons. Suppose that our opponent is
indoctrinated with the idea that the
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"capitalist" enemy never does anything
unless it is the outcome of a deep laid
and hostile plan. This results in "overinterpretation" as well as over-sensitiveness to whatever weapon changes are
attributed to us.
Assume further that the opposing
elite is heavily indoctrinated about the
importance of material factors in general The emphasis upon such tangibles
as the weapon and the factory underlines the significance attributed to developments on our side of these matters.
Suppose that the opposing elite is
indoctrinated to think of themselves as
"encircled" by a world conspiracy
headed by the U.S. This predisposes
them to give particular attention to
moves anywhere in the world that
appear in any way connected with us.
As instruments of national policy
during periods of low-burning (as well as
explosive) crisis it is clear that military
weapons excel in manageability. They
are amenable to central direction by
professional planning and operating personnel: and they are run with an eye to
security considerations.
The disposability of weapons, of
course, is a factor that often results in
the abuse of military instruments during
short-of-war periods. Suppose that the
problem is to induce the potential
enemy to abstain from an aggressive
action. If our weapons are unready, and
if the intelligence services of the other
side are in effective working order, it is
folly to imagine that we are "deterring
aggression" by moving some of our
ships, guns and planes closer to their
boundaries. (The task is always to estimate the opponent's estimate of our
intentions and capabilities).
The disposability of military weapons often leads to another abuse, which
is failure to plan military activity as part
of a properly prepared joint enterprise,
involving the articulation of diplomacy,
economics and ideological instruments.
A case in point is failure to provide in
advance for the timing of peacetime

weapon tests in such a manner as to
extract the maximum benefit.
We have seen the impromptu use of
weapons which brought about the withdrawal of an opposing power from a
position judged by us to be contrary to
our national policy. The use of the
Berlin airlift is a famous case. A more
dramatic example would be the use of
our combined weapons to bring about a
withdrawal from occupied countries.
The top decision makers must obviously
be willing to shoulder the risk of war in
connection with such moves. Otherwise
the deterrence effect will be frustrated
(as above, when the aim was to induce
the opponent to abstain rather than to
withdraw).
By putting so much emphasis upon
abstinence and withdrawal, we have
diverted attention from other aims of
national policy as they affect potential
opponents. The dominant objective may
be to induce cooperation for purposes
compatible with our security. One of
the declared goals of American policy is
to bring about by negotiation, if possible, an end to the present armament
race on terms compatible with our
national security.
It is generally recognized that if this
objective is to be achieved, a yet more
fundamental purpose must be realized. I
refer to the reconstruction of the policy;
orientation of the opposing power. It is
not enough from the standpoint of
national security to gain local and unlimited success in terms of abstinence,
withdrawal or cooperation. By this time
it has become quite clear that the
outlook must change of those who are
making the effective decisions elsewhere. In a sense our rearmament since
1945 has been a "short-of-war" activity
designed to accomplish a permanent
change, by peaceful means if possible,
of the effective policies of the Soviet
Union. By maintaining superiority in
arms, while abstaining on our part from
aggressive action, the hope has been to
reduce the confidence of the Soviet
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Union elite in their doctrinaire outlook
and their aggressive policies.
Finally, we turn to the use of military instruments in situations short of
war for the purpose of influencing an
associated or uncommitted power_ One
of the objectives can be withdrawaL We
may want to put a stop to the continuation of measures that in our judgment
endanger the peace, and promise no
compensating gains for security. We
may go so far as to use blockade to
bring about this modification of policy
on the part of a power with whom we
are on generally friendly terms.
The object may be abstention. We
may act to prevent extensions of measures which may appear contrary to our
national security interests.
The object may be cooperation. Obviously an overriding aim of NATO is to
organize cooperative activity against a
common threat.
The objective may be reconstruction.
The U.S. has repeatedly declared itself
in favor of bringing new institutions
of unity into existence in Western
Europe.
The consideration of any of these
moves involves an examination of factors affecting policy in the associated or
uncommitted country, an examination
no lcss exhaustive than we have referred
to in case of an opposing power. Without rcitcrating the fundamental categories, the crucial point is whether our
influencc will strengthen or weaken
national unity. Where the ruling elite of
the associated power does not have the
support of the underlying masses of the
population, we are in the delicate position of needing to handle our policy
instruments in such a manner as to bring
about integration without further weakening of the power in question. Where
the ruling elite has a great deal of
popular support we have the problem,
which has many conspicuous difficulties, of managing our relations in sueh a
manner as to refrain from compromising
our friends, and lowering their accept-

ability at home by seeming to transform
them into puppets of our national
needs.
There is no time to deal with the
political questions that arise in employing military instruments of national
policy in time of general war, or in
immediate postwar periods. To some
extent this omission is made because
most of the modern discussion of our
subject deals with problems of coalition
war, and in seeking to work in harness
with allies who may diverge in important ideological and organizational
particulars from one's own nation; and
in striving to accomplish subversive results in enemy jurisdiction.
So far as U.S. public policy has been
concerned in the past, some of the most
conspicuous failures have been in
meeting the problems that arise at the
end of active hostilities. It is essential to
define national policy well in advance of
the "onslaught of peace" if the political
preparation is to be successfully carried
through for the mastery of postwar
situations in ways that contribute to
national security goals.
On this note, we conclude. We have
been viewing the political factors that
concern national military strategy in a
world arena whose participants are more
diversified than the traditional conception of equal sovereign states. Weare
dealing with a bipolarizing world, a
world of international intergovernmental organizations, of transnational
political parties, of transnational pressure groups and individuals who may
operate across traditional lines. The
military strategist who is responsible to
the top decision makers of modern
powers under these conditions is confronted by a variety of problems and
tasks that differ in many ways from the
obligations of his predecessors. The
political factors include the present and
prospective assumptions to be entertained about the goals and objectives of
national policy, and the articulation of
military instruments with all the
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instruments at the disposal of national
policy. The task varies greatly in situations short of war, in general war and in
immediate postwar periods. The
decisions affecting our national security
now and in the future must be assessed
by locating the effective as distinct from
the formal elite, and by exploring the
affiliations and experiences that influence their political demands, expectations and loyalties. In predicting the
future of policy the impact of change in
all spheres of the social process must be
taken into account The potential impact of our own actions enters into the
evaluation of the important decisions of

the opposing leadership. Parallel questions must be raised for associated and
noncommitted powers, whether the
objectives are primarily abstinence,
withdrawal, cooperation or reconstruction. In general, political factors are
factors of intention of perspective: of
conceptions of goal; of expectations
concerning the past, present and future
as it affects these goals; and of loyalties.
The strategy of military instruments in
this context is to maximize the attainment of our national objectives by
influencing the expectations that favor
the actions that serve these security
rums.

----tp----

